The Price of Easy Money
I suspect that those reading my letters regularly are by now tried
of hearing more predictions of doom and gloom; they probably have
the impression that I am a congenital masochist. It is not true—I
can be as optimistic as the next guy. It is just that I believe that
economics is really about human beings, and that because of this,
bear markets are not only inevitable, but necessary. There is
something wonderfully edifying about emotional discomfort. The
economy needs corrections because that's what exposes all the
incorrect assumptions accumulated during the up cycles. Or as
Buffett says, "You don't know who is swimming naked until the tide
goes out."
Alan Greenspan has been running the FED for 18 plus years. During
his watch there have been only five down quarters (4Qtr 1990, 1Qtr
1991, 3Qtr 2000, 1Qtr 2001, and 3Qtr 2001). This is far less than
the historical norm and has raised Greenspan's status on Wall Street
to that of super hero. Under Big Al there were only soft landings;
serious economic discomfort has been banned and the water has never
dropped below chest high.
The problem is that prolonged comfort has conditioned financial
institutions globally to price their financial contracts with
inadequate risk premiums. If pain is the mother of wisdom, does not
comfort make us stupid? In debt, derivatives, and real estate,
lending institutions are experiencing low default rates and so
continue to hand out money fearlessly. Default rates are low because
money is easy to get. Having trouble with your house payments? Take
a home equity loan.
In truth, it is not fair to blame Greenspan alone for the surge
global liquidity—he has had plenty of help. Central banks worldwide
(particularly in Asia) have all joined the party. With global
interest rates at historic lows in some countries (such as Japan)
real interest rates are still negative. Institutions (pension plans,
foreign central banks and hedge funds) desperate for higher returns
are accepting higher and higher risk (using more leverage) and
getting paid very little for it.
For pension funds, the favorite solution is private equity. But with
money flooding the sector, there is no way that these funds will be
able to maintain high yields. Currently these private equity types
are in a frenzy to buy up everything that is not nailed down. This
is a dubious game. In Florida we flip condos, but in private equity
now the craze is flipping companies. The questions is what happens
if Mr. Market decides to go depressive? Who is going to buy their
IPOs?
There is, for all of the above maladies, one simple physic and it is
not a soft landing. What the world needs now is a recession—not
because pain is good but because it is necessary. It's pay-me-now or
pay-me-later. Easy money is a drug peddled by the foolish and the
longer we indulge, the worse will be the hangover. This is my
opinion and even though there is not one politician on the face of
the earth that will agree with me, there is some chance, however
small, that I might be right.
Having been a market participant during the late sixties and the
seventies, I remember it as a highly unpleasant experience: brutal
might be a better word. But, it was the things that we learned as
investors, business managers, and economic policy administrators in
the seventies that made the growth and prosperity of the eighties
and nineties possible. It is not so much that I am predicting a bear
market; it's that I yearn for one.
Risk, risk, who's got the risk?
In this wonderful new world of mortgage finance, the game might
properly be described as "risk, risk, who's got the risk?" Some
mortgages are originated by banks and some of those banks retain
some of the loans. In this case the problem is simple, if the
borrower cannot make his payments and the property cannot be sold
for a sum greater that is in excess of the mortgage amount, it is
the bank that takes the hit.
But today it is rarely that simple. Many mortgages are now thrown
into Wall Street's food processor and out come CDOs (collateralized
debt obligations), MBSs (mortgage backed securities), or asset
backed CDOs divided into PACs (planned amortization classes) or
support trances—you pick your acronym. The mortgages are put into
baskets (called trances) and sold to institutional investors. As I
understand the process (which is not very well) the mortgages in a
particular basket are grouped according to risk and the investor can
pick his own flavor, anywhere from triple-A to subprime floaters.
The problem is that there not enough risk priced into any of these
securities. There has been very little in the way of mortgage
defaults recently because asset inflation has been so rapid that it
keeps bailing out anyone that is overleveraged. Can't make your
payments this month? No problem—increase your homeowners line by
$50,000. Recent default rates do not reflect the real level of risk
that is baked into today's CDOs.
To add to this delight, the cost on incremental credit insurance is
a pittance, so you can morph your subprime floaters into investment
grade with a little credit insurance. But if the yields are
mispriced and the credit insurance is mispriced, who's got the risk?
In the world of hurricanes and earthquakes, if you misprice your
insurance premium when you sell a policy and go out of business, the
government is there to pay the claim. But if a credit insurance
company turns its belly to the sun who is going to pay the schlep
that bought the insurance?
And who is buying this risk? Grant's Interest Rate Observer has an
interesting answer, it is being exported, "Probably 95% of the loss
pieces are going to Asia and Europe: financial institutions,
insurance companies, and relatively unsophisticated banks."
Because of its accounting problems, Fannie Mae has been shrinking
its balance sheet, so the supply of triple-A federal agency assets
has been reduced to the point that foreign central banks may also be
dipping into the private label MBS market. But house prices keep
going up and defaults remain low even as the quality of the
underlying mortgages is steadily falling because of option ARMs and
a falling loan-to-value ratios.
As Jim Grant says, "Investors in mortgage CDOs go uncompensated for
the risk of a bear market in houses, or of a breakdown in mortgage
credit."
So what happens when Mr. Market Changes his mind? And if we are
exporting this risk, what happens to the dollar when the foreign
institutions find out they are the suckers?